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Author's Relevant Elements of CV 
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• Active Duty Air Force 98-07 
o 5 Years as program manager 
o 4 years as systems engineer at SMC 
• Air Force Reserve 07-Present 
o Defense Contract Management Agency 
• SE on Missile Defense Agency contracts 
• Northrop Gru111man 08-09 
o Senior Mission Systems Engineer 
• Counter Space Programs 
• Classified Programs 
"----~. . ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( 0 }---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Need 
The Need - Why Care 
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• A review of 95 defense projects bylhe GAO in 2006 found that in the 
last ten years: 
o 85% of all DoD projects were over budget by a total of $295 billion 
o Delayed by an average of 3.5 years 
• As a Result: 
o Much needed capability has been delayed or not even developed 
o Congress/ American public has lost faith in the military acquisition system 
o Technology advancement has slowed 
o Reduction in the industrial base 
o Less young people willing to enter the acquisition career field 
"A train wreck is coming. Runaway costs, prolonged delivery schedules and poor 
performance in the acquisition of major weapons amount to a form of 
unilateral disarmament." (Senator John McCain, March 2009) 
The Need - What 
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• GAO, NASA and others agencies found that a main cause 
for exceeding budget and schedule ,was requirements 
instability. 
o Requirements instability contributes to over 50% of all 
programs with budget and schedule delays 
o Drives funding instability which is the #1 cause 
r----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
, The DoD needs to eliminate requirements ! 
: instability on its space acquisition prograllls : 
I I 
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Research Goals 
Research Goals 
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1. Study the requirements stability /instability within the AF 
SMC space community 
2. Determine the main causes of requirements instability on 
the majority of space programs 
3. Provide recommendations to acquisition personnel that 
will help eliminate requirements instability 
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Research 
Methodology 
Research lv!ethodology 
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• Research Steps: 
1. Interview SE personnel on three SMC programs 
currently experiencing requirements instability 
1. AEHF, SBIRS and SBSS 
2. Including SMC Center and contractor 
2. Analyze current documentation pertaining to 
requiren1cnts instability on space programs 
3. Analyze the role of the contractor community in 
requirements instability 
4. Determine the causes of requirements instability 
s. Develop a list of recommendations 
Interviewees 
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• 24 systems engineers interviewed in total 
o SMC Center = 2 SMC Chief Systems Engineers 
o Wing= 3 
o Project= 7 
o Support= 8 
o Contractor = 4 
Program Center Wing Project Support Contractor* 
SMC 2 NIA 
SIBRS 1 2 4 
AEHF 1 3 3 
SBSS 1 2 1 
Total 2 3 7 8 4 
* program allocation not listed to protect privacy 
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Findings 
Findings _Overview 
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• The findings have been grouped into five following 
categories, and the results are discussed in this order: 
1. Acceptance of Incomplete Requirements 
2. Acceptance of Immature Technology 
3. Lack of Requirements Authority 
4. Sporadic Stakeholder Involvement 
s. Lack of Systems Engineering Expertise 
Acceptance of Incomplete Requirements 
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• The acceptance of incomplete requ-rrements is the #1 reason for 
requirements instability 
• The main blame should be placed on the current policy of Evolutionary 
Acquisitions: 
o Programs start knowing that their requirements are incomplete 
o Programs start as quick as possible to meet funding profiles, 
schedule milestones, urgent need request, politics and aggressive 
officers seeking promotion 
o Willingness to get a program started without knowing the value 
proposition 
• A secondary blame is that the SMC Commander is forced to write 
Operational requirements just before Milestone B, which should have 
been finalized by AFSPC at Milestone A. 
o Undermines the acquisition system 
o Reduces accountabilit 
Acceptance of Imf!lature Technology 
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• The acceptance of immaturity technology after KDP-B (Milestone B) is 
causing space programs to exceed their initial cost and schedule 
estimates by more than 33% 
o Mature technology has the average cost growth of 5% 
• The assigned roles of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and 
SMC are not consistent and followed uniformly. It is supposed to be as 
follows: 
o AFRL develops mature technology 
o SMC executes programs with mature technology 
• Regrettably the majority of SMC program do not follow this pattern 
o Therefore, SMC system engineers are forced to spend most of their 
time focusing on maturing technology instead of performing basic SE 
tasks 
o Leaving inadequate time for requirements management/control 
Lack of RequireJ]]_ents Authority 
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• Congress and the Pentagon hold Air Force leadership accountable for 
schedule and funding profiles, not requirements. 
• Therefore the requirements creation receives low priority within the Air 
Force. 
• 54% of SMC systems engineers interviewed cite poor requirements 
authority. 
• Air Force and SMC are experiencing a shortage of experienced systems 
engineers with the proper domain knowledge who have the power to 
fight for more authority. 
o SMC received fewer senior officers than the rest of the Air Force "7% of 
its engineers at the rank of lieutenant colonel compared to 10% for all 
Air Force." 
o Systems engineers at the ranks of Lt. Colonel and above with 14-20 
years of experience are regarded as experienced 
Sporadic Stakeholder Involvement 
---·-
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• In complex programs close coordination among 
stakeholders is critical for success 
• 90% of AF programs are initiated by industry marketing 
without identifying users, therefore proper stakeholder 
involvement is impossible 
• On the remaining 10% of the programs, user involvement is 
also pnor. 
• Programs encounter a lot of requirements instability from 
key stakeholders conducting drive-by changes. 
• The Program Sponsor and User are the least involved of 
any stakeholder. 
Lack of Systems EJ?.gineer Experience 
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• Congress and the Pentagon hold Afr Force leadership accountable for 
schedule and funding profiles, not requirements. 
• In consequence the SE career is less conducive to officer's careers than 
the financial career of a program manager. 
• As a result the number of SE at SMC has been steadily decreasing. 
• Starting 1996 with the policy: Total System Performance Responsibility 
(TSPR). 
o Reduction of SEs by 75% from 1000 in 1990 to 250 in 2005 
o In 1990, the DoD spent $80 billion a year on weapons systems and had an acquisition 
workforce of 500,000 people. Today, they spend $90 billion a year with an acquisition 
workforce of 200,000 people. 
o The overall number of officers certified in acquisition management has dropped from 28 
percent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2005. 
o Currently 37% of all critical acquisition positions are vacant according to the GAO 
• The training development for SEs officer is inadequate for the needs. 
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Case Studies 
Findings - Case Studies 
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• Each program exhibits all requirements instability causes 
but only the leading ones are listed 
o Table below illustrates the main complaints 
Re<JUiJ'enumts Instability Causes Centei· SIBRS AEHF SBSS 
.Acceptance of In11nature 
X X Tecl1110Iogy 
Acceptance of Incon1plete 
X Require1nents 
Lack of Require111ents 
X X Authority 
Sporadic Stakeholder 
X Involve111ent "' 
Lack of svste1ns 
. . 
eng111eenng ,., 
X X X expertise 
Case Study - SMC Center 
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• Lack of Requirements Authority 
o The Chief Systems Engineer and every systems engineer 
interviewed could not identify a single person who is 
ultimately accountable for the requirements 
o Everyone is focused on cost and schedule 
o Systems engineers are not focused on what is really important · 
in the requirements 
• Lack of Systems Engineering Expertise 
o Inadequate training and development 
o The lack of mentoring from senior engineers 
o The lack of manpower and funding to develop a SE curriculum. 
Case Study - SBIRS 
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• The original cost estimate = $3.2 Billion 
• Current cost estimated = $11.5 Billion. 
• Original completion 2002, now estimated 2012 
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Case Study - SBIRS 
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• Lack of requirements authorfty 
o SBIRS has 19 Key Performance Parameters (I<PP) and 12,600 
system level requirements. This is five times more than the 
typical DoD program 
o Requirements growth has become so pervasive that it is viewed 
as an expected and acceptable occurrence on the program 
• Lack of systems engineering expertise 
o The program does not have a rigid configuration control 
process to manage and control their requirements. 
• Acceptance of immature technology 
o SBIRS three critical technologies were immature at the start of 
the program: the main infrared payload sensor, the thermal 
management system and the onboard processor 
Case Study - AEHF 
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• The original cost estimate= $2.7 Billion 
• Current cost estimated= $9 Billion. 
• Original completion 2004, now estimated 2009. 
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Case Study - AEHF 
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• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
o Stakeholder involvement on the program has grown to include 
the Navy, Army and Intelligence 
o Increased the number of I<PP's from 6 to 13 
• Acceptance of incomplete requirements 
o The program was knowingly awarded with incomplete 
requirements because the Air Force needed to rapidly fill a gap 
in capability left by a Milstar launch failure 
o The AEHF program office falsely assumed that the satellite 
payload weight would be constant and there would be no 
growth in requirements. 
• Payload weight more than doubled 
• Additional hased arra antenna ca abilities were added 
Case Study - SBSS 
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• The original cost estimate= $189 Million 
• Current cost estimated = $900 Million. 
• Original completion 2007, now estimated Jan 2010 
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• Acceptance of immature technology 
o Immature spacecraft stabilization technology was accepted at 
the beginning of the program 
• Lack of systems engineering expertise 
o The prime contractor subcontracted the program and the 
program office did not understand this relationship and 
created mistrust 
o The program office has usurped design responsibilities from 
the prime contractor on occasions causing major rework 
o Currently, the average officer's SE experience is between 4 - 6 
years 
Summary of Problems 
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• Ambiguous Requirements 
o Requirements are disconnected from upper and 
lower level requirements. 
• Loss of Configuration Control 
o Many programs at SMC accept changes to their program baseline 
without going through a Configuration Control Board (CCB). 
• Inadequate Integration and Interface Analysis 
o Interface control standards are out of date at the program offices 
• Lack of Systems Engineering Planning 
o Inadequate understanding of the criticality of a SEP. 
• Lack of goals 
% 
5% 
10% 
@Requirements 
IIConfig C.ontrol 
D lnteg ration 
0Planning 
•Lack of Goals 
D Lack of Verification 
IIITesting 
o There are no SE goals set by leadership. This creates a chaotic environment because without goals, it is virtually 
impossible for the SE staff to seek improvements. 
• Lack of verification 
o The program office has the tendency to follow what the contractors say. It needs to get into the routine of, "trust but 
verify". 
• Inadequate Testing 
o There is a lack of rigorous testing by both, SMC and Contractor, especially of software, which causes re-work costs. 
Both the program office and contractor game the test without really finding the problems. 
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Recommendations 
Recommendations 
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• Senior Level Recommendations 
o Mandate stal(eholder involvement 
o Elevate systems engineering to a leadership position 
o Finalize operational requirements before arrival at SMC 
o Establish an unbias space requirements czar 
o Update KDP-B entrance criteria 
o Establish an aggressive systems engineering training program 
• Program Level Recommendations 
o Freeze requirements at RFP 
o Freeze technology at contract award 
o Let the laboratories develop technology 
o Develop a lessons learned process 
Senior Level Recommendations 
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• For senior leadership to address overarching SE problems 
• The senior level recommendations are for: 
SMC DoD Air Force 
Mandate Stakeholder Involvement 
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• Senior leadership needs to mandate that all stakeholders be 
intensely involved in a program from the beginning 
• Steps to be taken: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Mandate stakeholder identification before l{DP-A 
Have a signed charter by all stakeholders prior to 
requirements development and 
l\!Iandate that all changes to the requirements baseline 
be signed-off by all stakeholders. 
Elevate Systems Engineering to a Leadership 
Position ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( 0 }---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• The SMC commander must mandate that Systems engineer 
must have RAA for the technical program success 
• "Wing" program commanders should structure their 
organizations so that the program chief systems engineer 
and program manager are co-equal and report directly to 
the Wing Commander. 
• Senior leadership should be responsible for £1-111 
implementation of SE polices and practices throughtout the 
chain of command. 
Finalize Operational Requirements 
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• Senior leadership must mandate that AFSPC finalize all 
operational level requirements at I<DP-A. 
• SMC leadership should not accept any new programs that do not 
have a finalized Initial Capability Document (ICD) and 
Capability Development Document (CDD) 
• The ICD and CDD must be signed off by AFSPC, the user, Joint 
Requirements Council (JROC), Space Requirements Czar and all 
critical stakeholders prior to acceptance by SMC. 
o This is the only way to prevent programs from starting with 
incomplete requirements. 
• Air Force leadership must ensure that the requirements 
development organization at AFSPC has the proper resources to 
write operational level requirements 
Establish an unbiased Space Requireinents Czar 
------------------------------------. ----------------------------------------------------------------------( 0 [-------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
• OSD should establish an unbiased Space Requirements 
Czar 
o The Czar should be a permanent stakeholder on all major SMC 
programs and be a civilian appointed by OSD. 
o The Czar should report directly to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Space Acquisitions and not to the Air Force 
• The main goal of the Czar is to ensure requirements 
stability on all major SMC programs. 
• Update the Defense Acquisition Regulation 5000.2 and 
National Security Space (NSS) 03-01 entrance 
requirements to include approval of operational and system 
level requirements by the Czar. 
Update KDP-B Ent~ance Requirements 
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• Senior Leadership needs to update the Milestone B 
entrance requirements to include the following: 
• KDP-B and 5000.2 Milestone B entrance requirements 
o All stakeholders have approved milestone B entrance requirements; 
o The requirements for the program have been finalized; 
o The Program Office is adequately staffed with trained personnel; 
o The Space Requirements Czar has approved all finalized 
requirements 
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Establish a SE Training Program 
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• Develop a comprehensive SE development and training 
program. 
• Every Air Force engineer should be expected to pursue a 
Professional Engineer (PE) Certification in Systems 
Engineering. 
• The Air Force should create a new core Air Force Specialty 
Code (AFSC) for SE. 
• Establish the proposed Air Force Center of System 
Engineering Excellence at AFIT. 
• Allocate money and manpower to SE training. 
Establish an SE Training Program 
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Program Level Recommendations 
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• Eliminate the bad practices that are causing requirements 
instability. 
• Program level recommendations are meant for: 
o Systems Engineers 
o Program Managers 
o and other program personnel 
Freeze Requirements at RFP 
,.-"-~--
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• Operational and system level requirements must be 
finalized at Request for Proposal (RFP) release. 
o Finalized requirements will help program personnel write the 
best RFP possible 
o Freezing the requirements at RFP release will allow 
contractors to truly understand what is needed by the 
government and propose the best possible solution 
• Senior level leadership needs to make sure operational 
requirements are written and finalized prior to being 
accepted by SMC. 
Freeze Technology at Contract Award 
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• All programs should freeze technology selection at contract 
award and accept only technology that is at Technical 
Readiness Level (TRL) level 6 or above. 
o Accepting only TRL 6 and above will eliminate the need for 
programs to spend money and time to mature technology 
• In the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, Congress passed a 
Jaw that now requires the DoD to certify that all technology 
is demonstrated to a specific maturity level before being 
allowed into KDP-B or Milestone B, System Development. 
o This statement has specific ambiguity that a "truck can be 
driven through" · 
Let the Laboratories_Develop Technology 
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• The program office should not be conducting technology 
development. 
• A representative from AFRL should reside in all program 
offices to facilitate a better relationship. 
o Utilize AFRL to explore and mature any immature technology 
that they deem might be beneficial for a future planned 
capability 
o But will not drive future programs 
Develop Lessons-Learned Process 
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• All program office's at SMC need to develop and implement 
a capable lessons-learned process. 
• Develop a knowledge/ data base which is searchable and 
user friendly. 
• Designate one person to lead the lessons-learned program 
on each program. 
• Steps 
1. Capture relevant data from past and current space programs 
2. Catalogue the data into easy to use categories 
3. Communicating the data in the form of reports, training material 
pamphlets, white papers or other 
4. Incorporate the data into the development process and 
5. Institutionalize the lessons learned process into the acquisition process. 
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Conclusion 
Conclusion 
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• $285 billion dollars have been wasted in last ten years 
• Comprehensive study has been performed to study the 
reason(s) for requirements instability 
• Five critical reasons have been identified 
1. Acceptance of Incomplete Requirements 
2. Acceptance of Immature Technology 
3. Lack of Requirements Authority 
4. Sporadic Stakeholder Involvement 
5. Lack of Systems Engineering Expertise 
• Specific recommendation were created that if followed 
should eliminate the problem 
